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Abstract
This paper from 2000 is a presentation of a status quæstionis at that tiime,
to wit of the problem of the interpretability logic of all reasonable arith-
metical theories. We present both the arithmetical side and the modal
side of the question.
1 Introduction
What challenges does the future have in store for us? When talking provability
and interpretability logic, we are in the happy position of being able to give a
pretty definite answer. Three great problems is what we are facing. The first
—studied by R. Verbrugge and A. Berarducci, see [24], [4]— is the problem of
the provability logics of Buss’ S12 and Wilkie & Paris’ I∆0 +Ω1. The second is
the problem of the provabilitity logic of Heyting’s Arithmetic —studied by A.
Visser and R. Iemhoff, see [25], [28], [31], [30], [11]). The third problem, the
problem explained in this paper, is the problem of the interpretability logic of
all reasonable arithmetical theories.
In this article, the current status of the problem will be presented. The
paper provides the necessary definitions and a detailed explanation of the latest
conjecture. It will be made evident that the problem is a good problem in that
it intertwines modal and arithmetical ideas.
We did our best to make this exposition accessible to all readers with a mod-
icum of mathematical sophistication. The next subsection is a brief introduction
to interpretations.
1.1 What is an Interpretation?
The interpretations we are interested in are relative interpretations in the sense
of Tarski, Mostwoski and Robinson (see [22]). Consider theories U with language
LU and T with language LT . For the moment we assume that LU is a relational
language. An interpretation K of U in T is given by a pair 〈δ(x), F 〉. Here
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δ(x) is an LT -formula representing the domain of the interpretation.1 F is a
mapping that associates to each relation symbol R of LU with arity n an LT -
formula F (R)(x1, · · · , xn). Here x1, . . . , xn are suitably chosen free variables.
We translate the formulas of LU to the formulas of LT as follows:
• K(R(y1, · · · , yn)) := F (R)(y1, · · · , yn),
(We do not demand that identity is translated as identity.)
• K commutes with the propositional connectives,
• K(∀y A) := ∀y (δ(y)→ K(A)),
• K(∃y A) := ∃y (δ(y) ∧K(A)),
There are some trifling details —e.g. about avoiding variable clashes— that we
ignore here. In case LU contains functionsymbols, we first apply the usual algo-
rithm to eliminate functionsymbols to translate LU to a corresponding relational
language and then we apply the translation sketched above. (For an attempt to
get all the details right, see [29].) Finally, we demand of interpretations that for
all sentences A which are universal closures of axioms of U , we have T ⊢ K(A).
We will write K : T ✄ U for K is an interpretation of U in T . An alter-
native notation, which is more suitable if we want to study the category of
interpretations, is U
K
−→ T . We write T ✄ U , for K : T ✄ U , for some K.
Interpretations are used for various purposes: to prove relative consistency,
conservation results and undecidability results. The syntactical character of in-
terpretations has the obvious advantage that it allows us to convert proofs of
the interpreted theory in an efficient way into proofs of the interpreting theory.
Examples of relative interpretations are e.g. the interpretation of arithmetic in
set-theory, the interpretation of elementary syntax in arithmetic, the interpre-
tation of PA+ incon(PA) in PA.
Let’s forget, for a brief moment, about interpretations. Let’s think about e.g.
the construction of a model of two dimensional elliptic space in Euclidean three
dimensional space. This is a construction inside the standard model of Euclidean
geometry, which is modulo isomorphism the unique model of the second order
version of three dimensional Euclidean geometry, of (modulo isomorphism) the
standard model of two dimensional elliptic geometry. We construct this model
by stipulating that ‘point’ in the new sense will be line through a given point2,
‘line’ in the new sense is plane through the given point, ‘incidence of point and
line’ is the line representing the point is in the plane representing the line, etc.
If you inspect the construction, you will see that it just uses the resources of the
first order theory of three dimensional Euclidean geometry. Thus it provides
1More generally, we can use δ(~x), using several variables to represent one object. We are
mainly interested in theories with sequence coding in which we can restrict ourselves to δ with
just one free variable.
2To make this work in our set-up, we have to assume a version of Euclidean geometry with
a constant for a point and an axiom stating that the point is indeed a point. To avoid the
necessity of such inelegant stipulations we have to improve a bit on our present definition of
interpretation.
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a uniform way of transforming models of (first order) three dimensional Eu-
clidean geometry into models of (first order) two dimensional elliptic geometry.
A still closer inspection shows that our construction can be viewed as a purely
syntactical transformation. It provides a relative interpretation of (first order)
two dimensional elliptic geometry in (first order) three dimensional Euclidean
geometry.
We can capture the relation of interpretations and model constructions as
follows. Let Mod(V ) be the class of models of a theory V . An interpretation K
of U in T provides a uniform way to build internal models of U inside models of
T . Thus K provides us with a function, say Mod(K), from Mod(T ) to Mod(U).
Thus defined Mod is a contravariant functor from Theory, the category of theo-
ries and interpretations, to Class, the category of definable classes and definable
functions between classes. The idea of an interpretation as an ‘internal model
given in a uniform way’ is an important heuristic in thinking about interpre-
tations: the mind craves reality and visualisation rather than syntax. We will
exploit this heuristic in what follows. E.g. we will speak about one interpreta-
tion K being an end-extension of another one M, meaning that in every model
the internal model associated to K is an end-extension of the internal model of
M in a uniform way.
1.2 So What’s Reasonable?
We will be interested in interpretability of reasonable arithmetical theories.
More specifically we will be interested in what such theories have to say about
interpretability in these theories themselves. So what are reasonable arithmeti-
cal theories?
A theory, for our present purposes, is a predicate logical theory axiomatized
by axioms in an axiom set that is given by arithmetical formula α. Unless stated
otherwise we assume that α is simple, say a predicate corresponding with a class
that is decidable by a p-time algorithm. Note that our specification makes theory
an intensional notion, since we consider theories also from the point of view of
theories: α and β may specify the same axiom set, but a theory U thinking
about Tα and Tβ need not be aware of that.
‘Arithmetical’ has a primary and a secondary meaning. In the primary
meaning an arithmetical theory is an extension of Robinson’s Arithmetic Q
in the usual language of arithmetic with 0, S, + and ×. (We will often use
· instead of ×.) In the secondary meaning, an arithmetical theory is a pair
〈T,N〉, where N : T ✄Q. In other words an arithmetical theory is a theory with
designated predicates representing the natural numbers, representing zero, etc.
e.g. 〈ZF,N〉, where N is the usual set-theoretical representation of the natural
numbers, is an arithmetical theory. The intended meaning of arithmetical theory
in this paper is the secondary one.
The caution concerning the explicit designation of the natural numbers is
necessary, since not all interpretations of number theory are provably isomorphic
in a given theory. Thus the following three statements are equally true.
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1. con(ZF) is independent of GB (= Go¨del-Bernays Set Theory).
2. GB proves con(ZF).
3. GB proves ¬ con(ZF).
Here con(ZF) abbreviates a fixed arithmetical sentence, but we vary, in the
examples, the designated set of natural numbers. The correct formulation of
our statements is:
1. con(ZF) is independent of 〈GB,N〉.
2. 〈GB, I〉 proves con(ZF).
3. 〈GB,K〉 proves ¬ con(ZF).
Here N is the usual interpretation of the natural numbers in ZF lifted to GB. I
is a definable cut of the N -numbers and K is a suitable interpretation built using
a syntactic variant of the Henkin construction. Both N and I are standard in
that they represent the ordinary natural numbers (modulo isomorphism) in the
standard model. K, of course, cannot represent the standard numbers inside
any model.
Rather than viewing the possibility of having different sets of numbers as a
nuisance, we will make grateful use of it by switching between choices of what
‘the numbers’ are.
There is some arbitrariness in our singling out arithmetic as the thing we
are interested in, especially since representations of syntax play such a large
role in Go¨delean metamathematics. We could as have well decided to speak
about syntactical theories, counting e.g. 〈PA,S〉 as a syntactical theory, where
S is a designated interpretation of some reasonable theory of elementary syntax.
There are two reasons we will make the traditional choice to speak about arith-
metic: first simply because it is the traditional choice —changing it will cause
confusion—, secondly the methodology of definable cuts is easier to understand
in the context of arithmetic.
What is reasonable? It means at least: strong enough to verify the minimal
principles we are interested in. Take, e.g. the principle that tells us that if some-
thing is provable, then it’s provable that it’s provable. To verify the principle
in the obvious way, we need ∆0-induction, plus the totality of the function ω1,
where ω1(x) = 2
(log
2
x)2 . This principle is called Ω1. Another principle is the one
stating that interpretations can be composed, i.e. if K : U ✄V andM : V ✄W ,
thenM◦K : U ✄W . To verify it we need Σ-collection, also known as BΣ1, the
principle ∀x ≤ a ∃y A→ ∃b ∀x ≤ a ∃y ≤ b A, where A is Σ1.
Thus we demand that reasonable arithmetical theories contain a minimal
arithmetical theory Basic. Formally: a reasonable arithmetic is of the form
〈T,N〉, where N : T ✄Basic. The most plausible choice for Basic at the time of
writing is I∆0 +Ω1 +BΣ1. (See [27], for some shameless trickery to get rid of
the assumption BΣ1.)
The second demand that we pose, has to do with the coherence of the the-
ories. Given two theories T, U , we could take a disjoint union T ⊕ U in such a
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way that the T - and the U -objects have no recognizable interaction at all. So if
our numbers are ‘confined in’ T , they will not be able to ‘interact’ in any way
with the U -part. What we demand is that our theory is sequential: it should
contain (in the sense of interpretability) a theory of sequences of all objects the
theory can talk about. Here the lengths length(σ) and projections (σ)i are taken
from an initial segment of the designated numbers. Sequentiality is important
to make e.g. the construction of partial truthpredicates possible. For more on
sequentiality, see e.g. [10].
The third demand is not really a demand but a programmatic point. We
should keep the answer to the question what a reasonable theory is, somewhat
indefinite. The class of reasonable theories is that class of theories that allows a
beautiful answer to the question what the interpretability logic of all reasonable
theories is. E.g. it could happen that only the theories that contain the axiom
that exponentiation is total have a nice logic. Well, in that case we say that
those theories are the reasonable ones.
1.3 Approaches to Interpretability
What could the metamathematical study of interpretability and interpretations
look like? One idea is to study degrees of interpretability. Interpretability yields
a partial preorder on theories. Dividing the associated equivalence relation out
we get a degree-theory. Degree-theory has been studied by P. Lindstro¨m and
C. Bennet (see e.g. [14] and [2]) and by V. Sˇvejdar (see [21]). The work on
degrees was very fruitful as a generator of methods and techniques. Some of
these techniques have been adapted for application in interpretability logic.
We feel that it could be very fruitful to extend the degree-theoretic ap-
proach to the study of suitable categories of interpretations. The more ex-
pressive category-theoretical language might be better suited to express certain
basic insights concerning interpretability. There were some attempts to initiate
such a study, but these attempts did yield less than satisfactory results. Some
further experimentation is needed to isolate the right categories.
The approach to interpretability that is the focus of this paper is the modal
study of interpretability.3 The modal language has the advantage of expressive-
ness, but there are costs. First modal logic is about ‘propositions’ not about
theories. This means that we cannot directly study the relations K : T ✄ U or
even T ✄U . What we study is the relation A✄T B, which is defined as follows:
• A✄T B :⇔ (T +A)✄ (T +B).
Here T is the base theory. We speak of (sentential) interpretability over T .
Secondly, we are interested in iterating the modal connectives. We want to
3Lev Beklemishev places this kind of study between structural prooftheory which studies
specific proof systems and proofs, and recursion theoretic prooftheory where theories are
considered as RE sets of theorems. Here we abstract away from many details of the proof
system and from detailed proofs, however e.g. the defining formula of the set of axioms is a
feature that can make a difference. Perhaps one could say that the modal study of provability
and interpretability is part of intensional prooftheory.
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allow things like (A✄B)✄C. This means that our research is restricted to base
theories T that have sufficient coding ability to formalize a decent amount of
reasoning concerning interpretations. This restriction is substantial since lots of
important interpretations fall outside the scope of our investigation. If we pay
the costs, there are some gains.
1. We have a modal language that is rich enough to articulate both the
incompleteness theorems and the model existence lemma, which is the
heart of the completeness theorem.
2. Some substantial reasoning concerning interpretability can be executed in
this modal logic.
3. The Kripke model theory of the logic is highly interesting qua modal logic.
4. The arithmetical side of the study involves substantial arithmetical in-
sights. As we will see, in an indirect way, our logic can talk about large
and small numbers.
Before we introduce the modal logics, we interpolate a brief introduction to
some salient arithmetical facts.
2 Parvulae Arithmeticae
2.1 Coding
Since the function ω1 = λx.2
(log
2
x)2 is present in our basic system of arithmetic
Basic, we have p-time computable functions available. Having these, arithmeti-
zation of syntax becomes a piece of cake. The most obvious go¨delnumbering of
strings in a given alphabet is also the best one. We enumerate first the strings
of length 0, then the strings of length 1, and so on. The strings of the same
length we order alphabetically. We assign to each string as go¨delnumber simply
its ordernumber in the sequence so obtained. It turns out, using a trick due to
Smullyan, that operations on strings like concatenation can be easily arithmeti-
cally represented under this coding. An important insight is the elementary fact
that the go¨delnumber of a string σ is of order Alength(σ), where A is the cardinal-
ity of the alphabet. We will code syntactical elements, like formulas and proofs,
by writing them out and then taking the code of the resulting string.
We will write ✷TA for the arithmetization of T proves A and A ✄T B for
the arithmetization of T +A interprets T +B. If A contains a free variable x,
✷TA is the arithmetization of the result of substituting the numeral of x in A
for “x” is provable in T ’. Further conventions are similar.
2.2 Efficient Numerals
It is definitely not a good idea to represent the number n by the numeral
n
︷ ︸︸ ︷
S · · ·S 0. The go¨delnumber of this numeral will be of order 2cn, for a fixed
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constant c. So the function sending a number to the code of its numeral will be
exponential. Exponentiation is not generally available in Basic. Hence we will
use binary numerals instead. These are defined by num(0) := 0, num(2n+1) :=
S(SS0 · num(n)), num(2n + 2) := SS0 · num(n + 1). This representation has
the happy consequence that the go¨delnumber of the numeral of n is of order
2c log2 n, i.e. nk, for some fixed standard k.
2.3 Numbers Large and Small
We have to face the basic fact that we are going to use theories that do not have
full induction. Note that also quite strong theories may lack full induction, e.g.
〈GB,N〉. Thus, in our theories, it may happen that we have definable sets of
numbers containing 0 and closed under successor such that the theory doesn’t
think this set contains all (designated) numbers. In some cases the theory will
even positively know this set does not contain all numbers. Such definable sets
of numbers, closed under successor but not necessarily containing all designated
numbers, play an important role in the metamathematical study of arithmetics.
For many purposes it is convenient to put stronger demands on these sets: we
ask that they are definable cuts. Let 〈T,N〉 be an arithmetical theory. Here
N = 〈δ, F 〉.
An LT -formula I is/presents a 〈T,N〉-cut iff T proves that:
1. Ix→ δx,
2. (Ix ∧N (x = y))→ Iy,
3. I is downwards closed under <, i.e.
(I(x) ∧N (y < x))→ I(y),
4. I is closed under 0, S, +, × and ω1, i.e.
(a) N (x = 0)→ Ix,
(b) (Ix ∧N (Sx = y))→ Iy,
(c) (Ix ∧ Iy ∧N (x + y = z))→ Iz,
(d) (Ix ∧ Iy ∧N (x · y = z))→ Iz,
(e) (Ix ∧N (ω1x = y))→ Iy.
Note that ‘ω1x = y’ is, in the usual set-up, an abbreviation of a complex
formula.
We will sometimes write ‘x ∈ I’ for ‘Ix’.
Using a wonderful trick invented by Solovay [20], we can always ‘shorten’ a
definable set of numbers, T -provably closed under successor to a T -cut. Cuts
can be considered as ‘notions of smallness’: the numbers inside the cut are
‘small’, the ones above it ‘big’.
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We will consider cuts themselves as interpretations of arithmetic, confusing
the cut I with the interpretation 〈I, F 〉, where F is the interpretation function
associated with N . It is easy to see that 〈I, F 〉 is indeed an interpretation.
From this point on, we will often suppress the designated cut N , writing as if
N were the identity interpretation.
A startling fact about cuts is the outside big, inside small principle. Even if T
may fail to believe that every number is in the T -cut I, we do have:
Theorem 2.1 T ⊢ ∀x✷T x ∈ I.
The point is that we can have big proofs showing that big numbers are small.
Here is a somewhat more elaborate proofsketch.
Proof of 2.1. We reason informally in T . Let σ be a (standard) proof of
∀x (x ∈ I → S(SS0 · x) ∈ I). We convert a proof π of n ∈ I into a proof of
S(SS0 · n) ∈ I as follows.
π
σ
∀E
n ∈ I → S(SS0 · n) ∈ I
→ E
S(SS0 · n) ∈ I
Similarly we convert a proof of n ∈ I into a proof of (SS0·n) ∈ I. Clearly a proof
of n ∈ I will use in the order of log2 n steps. The number of symbols in a step of
the proof can be estimated by a log2 n+ b for fixed standard numbers a and b.
The number of symbols in the proof will be estimated by: log2 n · (a log2 n+ b).
Let c := a+ b. We can replace our estimate by: c · (log2(n+2))
2. So the size of
the Go¨delnumber of the proof will be estimated by 2c·(log2(n+2))
2
= (ω1(n+2))
c.
The function λx.(ω1(x+ 2))
c is present in Basic. qed
2.4 Cuts and Interpretations
If we think of an interpretation K of U in T as an inner model of U inside a
model of T , we can ask how the T -numbers do compare to the U -numbers as
seen via K. To be pedantically precise, if the T -numbers are given by N and if
the U -numbers are given by M, how does the internal model of Basic given by
N compare to the internal model of Basic given by K ◦M?
In case T has full induction, the answer is simple. Let’s for the moment step
into the outside world and remind ourselves of a basic fact about non-standard
models of arithmetic. The natural numbers form (modulo embedding) an initial
fragment of every non-standard model. I.o.w. every non-standard model is an
end-extension of the standard model. We can prove that fact by defining the
embedding of the natural numbers into the non-standard model by external
recursion and by subsequently proving the desired properties of the embedding
by external induction. Essentially the same argument can be repeated in T . We
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define the embedding, using the fact that we are supposed to have sequences
of objects, by an explicit T -formula and verify its properties with T -induction.
The upshot is that the U -numbers as seen via K form an end-extension of the
T -numbers.
Now what happens if T doesn’t have full induction? The answer to this
question has been provided by Pavel Pudla´k in his fundamental paper [16].
Here it is. There is a T -cut I such that the U -numbers as viewed via K are an
end-extension of I.
The argument for Pudla´k’s theorem is a refinement of the usual argument
sketched above: where we lack induction, we compensate by switching to a
smaller cut.
A Closer Look
To convince the reader that the statement of Pudla´k’s theorem makes sense,
we spell out the result in the pedantic mode. Remember that we assumed
that T was really 〈T,N〉 and U was really 〈U,M〉. Now Q := K ◦ M is an
interpretation of Basic in T , representing the U -numbers as viewed by T via
K. Pudla´k’s Theorem tells us that there is a 〈T,N〉-cut I such that there is,
verifiably in T , a definable embedding of I into an initial segment of the U -
numbers as viewed in T via Q. This means that there is a T -formula E such
that T proves:
1. Exx′ → (Ix ∧ δQ(x′))
(E is a relation between I and δQ),
2. (Exx′ ∧N (x = y) ∧Q(x′ = y′))→ Eyy′
(E is a congruence w.r.t. the relevant ‘identities’),
3. Ix→ ∃x′ Exx′
(E is total on I),
4. (Exx′ ∧Exy′)→ Q(x′ = y′)
(E is a function),
5. (Exx′ ∧Eyx′)→ N (x = y)
(E is injective),
6. (Exx′ ∧Q(y′ < x′))→ ∃y (N (y < x) ∧ yEy′)
(The E-image of I is downwards closed in Q),
7. (Exx′ ∧N (x = 0)→ Q(x′ = 0)
(E commutes with 0),
8. (Exx′ ∧Eyy′ ∧N (Sx = y))→ Q(Sx′ = y′)
(E commutes with S),
9. (Exx′ ∧Eyy′ ∧Ezz′ ∧N (x+ y = z))→ Q(x′ + y′ = z′)
(E commutes with +),
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10. (Exx′ ∧Eyy′ ∧Ezz′ ∧N (x · y = z))→ Q(x′ · y′ = z′)
(E commutes with ×).
The image, say J , of the 〈T,N〉-cut I is easily seen to be a 〈T,Q〉-cut. T shows
thatE is an isomorphism between I and J . J is not generally internally definable
in K, i.o.w. there need not be an LU -formula G such that T ⊢ ∃xExx′ ↔
K(Gx′).
3 Interpretability Logic Explained
3.1 Description of the System IL
The language of interpretability logic, Lint, is the language of modal proposi-
tional logic extended with a binary modal operator ✄. We read A ✄ B as: A
interprets B. We will write ✸A as an abbreviation of ¬✷¬.
Let U be a reasonable arithmetical theory. An interpretation (.)∗ of Lint
into U maps the atoms on sentences of LU , commutes with the propositional
connectives and satisfies:
(✷A)∗ := ✷UA
∗ and (A✄B)∗ := A∗ ✄U B
∗.
We study the interpretability principles valid in theories U , asking ourselves for
which C in the modal language we have U ⊢ C∗, for all (.)∗ and asking ourselves
which principles are valid in all reasonable theories. The set of principles valid
in U is called Il(U). The set of principles valid in all reasonable theories will
be called Il(all).4
We introduce the basic modal logic IL. The principles of this logic are arith-
metically sound for a wide class of theories and for various interpretations of
its main connective ✄.5 The theory is arithmetically incomplete for all known
arithmetical interpretations. The motivation for studying this specific set of
axioms comes from its modal simplicity and elegance.
IL is the smallest logic in Lint containing the tautologies of propositional
logic, closed under modus ponens and the following rules. (A principle is just a
rule with empty antecedent.)
L1 ⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ ✷A
L2 ⊢ ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B)
L3 ⊢ ✷A→ ✷✷A
L4 ⊢ ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A
J1 ⊢ ✷(A→ B)→ A✄B
4For the modal language restricted to the unary connective ⊤✄A in combination with ✷,
the problem of the interpretability logic of all theories has been solved by Maarten de Rijke,
see his [9].
5We can also interpret ✄ as partial conservativity w.r.t. a suitable class of formulas.
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J2 ⊢ (A✄B ∧ B ✄ C)→ A✄ C
J3 ⊢ (A✄ C ∧ B ✄ C)→ (A ∨B)✄ C
J4 ⊢ A✄B → (✸A→ ✸B)
J5 ⊢ ✸A✄A
L1-4 are the well-known principles of Lo¨b’s Logic. IL is certainly valid in all
reasonable theories U . We will provide the arithmetical justifications of the
principles in subsection 3.2.
D. de Jongh and A. Visser proved that IL has unique and explicit fixed points.
See [8]. No characterization of the closed fragment of IL has been given. IL sat-
isfies interpolation, see [1]. De Jongh and Veltman prove a modal completeness
theorem w.r.t. Veltman models. See [6].
Here is a sample of IL-reasoning. We prove: ⊢ A ✄ (A ∧✷¬A). First, by
L1-4, we can derive, taking the contraposition of L4: ⊢ ✸A→ ✸(A ∧✷¬A). So,
by L1 and J1, we find: ⊢ ✸A✄ ✸(A ∧✷¬A). Applying J5 and J2, we get: (a)
⊢ ✸A✄ (A ∧✷¬A). We also have, by L1 and J1: (b) ⊢ A ✄ ((A ∧✷¬A) ∨✸A)
and (c): ⊢ (A ∧✷¬A)✄ (A ∧✷¬A). Applying J3 and J2 to (a), (b) and (c) we
arrive at the desired result.
Putting ⊤ for A in the principle we just derived, we see that it follows that
one can construct, in a uniform way, inside every model of a given arithmetical
theory T an internal model of T + incon(T ).
3.2 The Arithmetical Validity of IL
Verification of the L-principles
It is well known that the principles of Lo¨b’s Logic can be derived in Buss’ S12
(see [5]) or in Wilkie & Paris’ I∆0 + Ω1 (see [32]). Since Basic is supposed to
extend S12, we are done. The proof of L3 is by induction on the subformulas
of ✷TA, using the fact that ✷TA is a ∃∆b0-predicate. A ∆
b
0-formula only has
logarithmically bounded quantifiers.
It is a remarkable fact that L3 is doubly redundant in IL. By a clever ar-
gument, due to Dick de Jongh, we can derive L3 from L1,2,4. However this
redundancy is not arithmetically helpful, since the usual arithmetical verifica-
tion of Lo¨b’s axiom L4 uses the validity of L3.6 The second way is to derive
L3 from J5 and J4. The striking thing about this alternative proof is that it
provides a really different way to obtain a T -proof of ✷TA from a T -proof of
A.7 L3 is one of those cases where we have one fact but two insights.
Both styles of proofs of L3, yield on inspection sharper results, like:
6We can derive L4 without using L3 by employing a surprising argument of Kreisel (pre-
sented in [19]). However, this argument includes the verification of J5.
7Andre´ van Kooy showed in his masters thesis (Department of Philosophy, Utrecht Uni-
versity) that for finitely axiomatized theories in a relational language one can make the trans-
formation of a proof of A into a proof of the provability of A linear time. This seems to be
only possible via the J4,5-route.
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• T ⊢ ✷TA→ ✷T✷ITA
Here I is any T -cut. We write ✷ITA for I(✷TA) —note that we need only
to relativize the unbounded existential quantifier of ✷TA to I.)
• T ⊢ ✷TA→ ✷T△TA
Here △ stands for either cutfree, Herband or tableaux provability.
The derivation of the first strengthening in the induction on subformulas style,
runs as follows.
We obtain at a certain point ✷TproofT (x, gn(A)). (Here gn is the go¨delnumb-
ering function.) The outside big, inside small principle tells us that ✷Tx ∈ I.
Ergo, ✷T✷
I
TA.
Verification of J1
The validity of J1 is witnessed by the identity interpretation ID.
Verification of J2
If K : A✄T B and M : B ✄T C, then (M◦K) : A✄T C.
Verification of J3
J3 is valid, since, given any two interpretations K and M and any sentence A,
we can construct an interpretation K[A]M, the disjoint A-sum of K and M,
that behaves like K if A and like M if ¬A. We take:
• δK[A]M(x) := ((δK(x) ∧A) ∨ (δM(x) ∧¬A)),
• (K[A]M)(P )(~x) := ((K(P )(~x) ∧A) ∨ (M(P )(~x) ∧¬A))
We find that if K : A✄T C and M : B ✄T C, then (K[A]M) : (A ∨B)✄T C.
Verification of J4
J4 tells us that relative interpretability implies relative consistency. If we would
have ✷T¬B and K : A✄T B, then it would follow that ✷T (A→ ⊥K), and hence
✷T¬A.
Verification of J5
J5 is the interpretation existence lemma. It is the syntactical realization of the
Henkin model existence lemma. Inspecting the usual proof of the model ex-
istence lemma, one sees that it involves the construction of a set of sentences
describing a model. This set can as well be viewed as describing an interpreta-
tion. The set is constructed as a path in a binary tree. This path is described by
a ∆02-predicate. The desired properties of the set of sentences are verified using
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induction. Thus the whole argument can easily be verified in PA. The construc-
tion can be executed in almost any arithmetical theory by compensating for the
lack of induction by switching to definable cuts.8
A moment’s reflection shows that the choice of the numbers in which we
execute the Henkin construction is irrelevant. So, in particular, this set of
numbers, might very well be some T -cut I. Thus we arrive at the following
sharpening of J5.
• T ⊢ ∀I (✸ITA✄T A).
Here ✸ITA stands for I(✸TA), which is T -equivalent to
∀x ∈ I ¬ provT (x, gn(¬A)),
where gn is the go¨delnumbering function.
Note that the first strengthened version of L3, follows easily from J4 and
the sharpened version of J5. We have T ⊢ ∀I (✸ITB ✄T B), and, hence, T ⊢
∀I (✸T✸ITB → ✸TB). Replacing B by ¬A, contraposing and cleaning up
spurious negations (using L1,2), we get: T ⊢ ∀I (✷TA→ ✷T✷ITA).
3.3 Beyond IL
IL is certainly arithmetically sound. However, it is not arithmetically complete
for any reasonable arithmetical theory T and for any known interpretation of
✄.
Montagna’s Principle M
Let us first consider Peano Arithmetic, PA. The theory satisfies a further prin-
ciple: Montagna’s Principle.
M ⊢ A✄B → (A ∧✷C)✄ (B ∧✷C)
The PA-validity of M was known independently to Sˇvejdar and Lindstro¨m.
Arithmetical completeness for the system ILM:=IL+M was conjectured by A.
Visser. It was proved independently by V. Shavrukov (see [17]) and A. Be-
rarducci (see [3]). For nice presentations of the proof see also [33] or [12]. It
turns out that ILM is sound and complete for all reasonable arithmetical theories
satisfying full induction.9 Here we just verify the arithmetical validity of M.
Let T have full induction. We prove the stronger principle:
• ⊢ A✄T B → (A ∧S)✄T (B ∧S), for S ∈ Σ01
8We are not quite sure who found this fact first. It might be well have been discovered
independently by Friedman, Pudla´k and Solovay.
9In fact the class is somewhat bigger. The reader is referred to [29] for further elaboration.
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Reason informally in T . Suppose K : (T +A) ✄ (T + B). Reason in T . (So we
are in T two deep.) Suppose A and S. Consider K. We will certainly have K(C)
for each axiom C of T and K(B), since we have A. Now the T +B-numbers seen
via K are an end-extension of the T+A-numbers, as explained in subsection 2.4.
Moreover, Σ01-sentences are preserved by end-extensions. Hence, we have K(S).
The Persistence Principle P
The persistence principle P is the following principle:
P ⊢ A✄B → ✷(A✄B).
The persistence principle is valid for interpretations in finitely axiomatized rea-
sonable arithmetical theories T . The reason is simple. Let C be the conjunction
of the axioms of T . Then, to obtain our principle, is is sufficient to verify:
T ⊢ ∃K✷T (A→ K(C ∧B))→ ✷T∃K✷T (A→ K(C ∧B))
which is obviously valid by verifiable ∃∆b0-completeness.
Albert Visser has shown that ILP is arithmetically complete for each finitely
axiomatized reasonable theory that proves Superexp, the axiom stating that
superexponentiation is total. See [26]. It is definitely known that ILP is not
complete for I∆0 +BΣ1 + Exp, where Exp is the axiom stating that exponenti-
ation is total.
The Principle W
The first principle that was found to be valid in all theories that strictly extends
IL is the principle W. ‘W’ for “weak”.
W ⊢ A✄B → A✄ (B ∧✷¬A)
For some time it was conjectured that ILW was Il(all). This conjecture was
eventually refuted. Before we turn to the next principle, we verify W.
Remember our verification of the principle ⊢ A ✄ (A ∧✷¬A). Now all the
principles used remain valid if we relativize all the modal operators at nesting
depth 1 to a T -cut I. Thus we obtain:
• T ⊢ ∀I (A✄T (A ∧✷
I
T¬A))
Now reason in T . Suppose, for some K, we have K : A ✄T B. Let J be
the T + A-cut such that, in T + A, J is (isomorphic to) an initial segment
of the T + B-numbers viewed via K. If J is not a T -cut, we may replace
it by J [A]ID, which certainly is a T -cut. (The notation (·)[·](·) was intro-
duced when explaining J3.) So we can assume that J is a T -cut. Now we
have (a) K : (A ∧✷JT¬A) ✄T (B ∧✷T ¬A), since J is initial in K and since Σ
0
1-
sentences are upwards persistent. By our previous consideration we have (b)
A✄T (A ∧✷
J
T¬A). Composing (a) and (b) we arrive at the desired result.
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The Principle M0
The next principle that was discovered is the principle M0.
M0 ⊢ A✄B → (✸A ∧✷C)✄ (B ∧✷C)
Here is the arithmetical verification. Reason in T . Suppose K : A✄T B. Let J
be the cut of the T+A-numbers, which is isomorphic to an initial segment of the
T + B-numbers viewed via K. As above, we may assume J to be a T -cut. We
have ✷T (✷TC → ✷T✷JTC) and, hence, ✷T ((✸TA ∧✷TC)→ ✸T (A ∧✷
J
TC)). It
follows that:
✸TA ∧✷TC ✄T ✸T (A ∧✷
J
TC)
✄T A ∧✷
J
TA
✄T B ∧✷TC
The last step, is witnessed by K, using the fact that K is an end-extension of
J and the upwards persistence of Σ01-sentences.
M0 can be viewed as a kind of ‘M-ified’ version of J5. First note that we can
rewrite J5 as the equivalent:
• ⊢ A✄B → ✸A✄B
We get M0, by plugging the ✷C’s into the consequent.
The Principle W∗
W∗ is the following principle.
W∗ ⊢ A✄B → (B ∧✷C)✄ (B ∧✷C ∧✷¬A)
Dick de Jongh has shown that W∗ is equivalent over IL with W +M0.
The Principle P0
For some time ILWM0 or, if you wish, ILW
∗ stood as the conjectured candidate
for being Il(all). Recently, Albert Visser found a new principle P0.
P0 ⊢ A✄✸B → ✷(A✄B)
The discovery of P0 will be described in greater detail in subsection 4.4.
The arithmetical verification of P0 is as follows. Reason in T . Suppose
K : A ✄T ✸B. Take a suitably large finite subtheory T0 of T . (We can take
T0 standardly finite.) We certainly have K : (T + A) ✄ (T0 + ✸TB). Hence,
(a) ✷T (K : (T + A) ✄ (T0 + ✸TB)). On the other hand, by interpretation-
existence: (b) ✷T ((T0 +✸TB)✄ (T +B)). This last argument works, since an
interpretation can be built in any arithmetical base theory: we could even have
taken T0 = Q, where Q in Robinson’s Arithmetic! Finally, composing (a) and
(b), we get: ✷T ((T +A)✄ (T +B)).
We can view P0 as a ‘P-ified’ version of J5. First note that we can rewrite J5
as the equivalent:
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• ⊢ A✄✸B → A✄B
We get P0, by putting a box in front of the consequent.
We can now pose a new conjecture: ILW∗P0
?
= Il(all).
4 Modal Semantics
4.1 Veltman Semantics
Frank Veltman, in response to questions of Albert Visser, found a purely modal
Kripke style semantics for interpretability logic. Frank Veltman was working on
conditionals at that time. However, ✄ is not a proper conditional. See [23].
Veltman’s semantics extends the well-known Kripke semantics for L. Recall
that an L-frame is a pair 〈W,R〉 whereW is a nonempty set and R is a transitive
conversely well-founded relation on W 2. An L-model is a triple 〈W,R,〉 where
〈W,R〉 is an L-frame and  is a forcing relation which commutes in the usual way
with the connectives (w  A ∧B ⇔ w  A and w  B, etc.) and, moreover,
w  ✷A ⇔ ∀v (wRv ⇒ v  A). An IL-frame or Veltman frame is a triple
〈W,R, {Sw | w ∈W}〉 such that:
1. 〈W,R〉 is an L-frame.
2. Sw ⊆ w↑ × w↑ (w↑ := {x ∈ W | wRx}).
3. (R ↾ (w↑)) ⊆ Sw.
4. Sw is reflexive.
5. Sw is transitive.
A Veltman model is a quadruple 〈W,R, {Sw | w ∈ W},〉. Here the triple
〈W,R, {Sw | w ∈ W}〉 is a Veltman frame and  is a forcing relation with the
extra condition that
• w  A✄B ⇔ ∀u (wRu  A⇒ ∃v u Sw v  B).
(We write e.g. ‘uSw v  B’ for ‘uSwv and v  B’.)
Veltman semantics is designed so that IL is sound and complete with respect to
it.
4.2 Frames
Consider a frame F = 〈W,R, {Sw | w ∈ W}〉. We define:
• F |= A :⇔ for all forcing relations , and for all w∈W , w  A.
• F is an ILW-frame if, for any x, R;Sx is conversely well-founded.
Here u(R;Sx)v if, for some w, uRwSxv.
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• F is an an ILM0-frame if xRyRzSxuRv ⇒ yRv.
• F is an ILW∗-frame if it is both an ILW and an ILM0-frame.
• F is an ILM-frame if ySxzRu⇒ yRu.
• F is an ILP-frame if xRyRzSxu⇒ zSyu.
We have the following correspondences: F is an ILW-frame, an ILM0-frame, an
ILW∗-frame, an ILM-frame, an ILP-frame if, respectively, F |= W, F |= M0,
F |= W∗, F |= M, F |= P.
4.3 Completeness Results
The logics IL, ILM, ILP are all modally complete with respect to their corre-
sponding classes of frames. (See e.g. [12] or [29].) In [7] it is shown that ILW is
also modally complete. IL, ILW, ILM and ILP can be all shown to have the finite
model property. It follows that they are decidable. In [13] the modal complete-
ness of ILM0 is proved. Although this theory is conjectured to be decidable too,
its decidability is still open. Also, the question of the modal completeness for
ILW∗ remains open.
The arithmetical completeness of ILM and ILP was proved by embedding (the
algebras associated with) the Veltman models for ILM, respectively ILP into the
arithmetical theories. Thus the proofs of the arithmetical completeness theorem
essentialy involved all three features: modal systems, Veltman semantics and
arithmetical semantics.
4.4 The Story of P0
During fall of 1998, the progress in developing the modal completeness proof of
ILM0 stagnated. It was thought that, perhaps, it would simplify things if we
could strengthen the logic. Albert Visser tried to strengthen the frame condition
of ILM0 to arrive at a stronger principle. Remember that the frame condition
of ILM0 is:
• xRyRzSxuRv→ yRv.
Instead of demanding an R-relation between x and v, one can demand an Sy-
connection between z and v. If we have zSyv, we must also have yRv, so
indeed this move results in strengthening the frame condition. A corresponding
principle, baptized P0, turns out to be:
P0 ⊢ A✄✸B → ✷(A✄B).
Clearly every ILP0-frame is an ILM0-frame. If the logic ILP0 were modally com-
plete then we would have: ILP0 ⊢ M0 (i.e. ILP0 proves every instance of M0.)
In [13] it is shown that ILP0 0 M0 and hence that ILP0 is modally incomplete.
The proof makes essential use of ILset-models which are a refinement of Veltman
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models, invented by Dick de Jongh. All logics are also sound w.r.t. the ILset-
models, but more distinctions between principles become apparent. The main
idea is that S-relations don’t run to a single world but to a set of worlds. More
details can be found in [13].
The real surprise was that the principle P0 —which came from purely modal
considerations— is valid in any reasonable arithmetical theory and hence should
be in the core logic Il(all).
4.5 New Principles by Modal Refinements
If we are looking for principles in Il(all), we know for sure that they should be
both in ILP and in ILM. A priori, there is an infinite search space but, Veltman
models provide pretty good guidance in this quest. We shall make a convention
on visualizing frame conditions. First, we do not represent all the relations in
the pictures. If aRb and bRc are drawn, we will rather not draw the aRc that
is dictated by transivity. So by a picture we actually mean its closure w.r.t. the
closure conditions for Veltman models. Secondly, the R-relations will be drawn
as straight lines and the S-relations as curved lines.
x
S
x
M :
Figure 1.
y z
u
If some specific relation is imposed by the principle whose frame condition we
want to represent, we will indicate this by drawing a dashed line. Bearing this
in mind we can visualize the frame condition of M. This condition was:
xRySxzRu⇒ yRu.
In picture 1. this condition is represented. The imposed yRu is drawn as a
dashed straight line.
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S
x
x
y
Sy
u
P :
Figure 2.
z
When depicting the frame condition of P, we get a similar picture. The frame
condition of P was:
xRyRzSxu⇒ zSyu.
The imposed zSyu is drawn as a curved intersected arrow. Note that the rela-
tions xRu and yRu are not shown although they have to exist.
A modal principle in Il(all) should hold on all ILM- and ILP-frames. Conse-
quently the frame condition of this principle should hold in both frame classes
too. This was, of course, the case for all the principles considered so far. For
example in both ILM-frames and ILP-frames we have that R;Sx is conversely
well-founded, for any x. And this was precisely the frame condition of W, a
principle that holds in any reasonable arithmetical theory.
We can use the pictorial heuristic to guess new principles. The search space
for new principles is thus confined to principles whose corresponding frame con-
ditions are shared consequences of both the respective frame conditions of P
and M. An example clarifies this concept.
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S
x
x
y
u
z
v
0M  :
Figure 3.
A frame condition is drawn in picture 3. We assume xRyRzSxuRv. Now the
frame condition is that we impose yRv. The corresponding principle is readily
found. It is M0 ⊢ A✄B → (✸A∧✷C)✄ (B ∧✷C). The R-relation between y
and v is implied by the ILM frame condition because in an ILM frame we should
have zRv and thus yRv as well. It is also implied by the frame condition of ILP
because in an ILP-frame one has zSyu and obviously also yRu. And this again
yields yRv. The relation yRv is both in the closure of the frame under M and
under P. So yRv is in the intersection.
S
x
x
y
u
z
v
E
w
New:
Figure 4.
Reflection on the previous reasoning tells us that in both the ILM- as in the
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ILP-closure it is possible to go from y in two R-steps to v. In the M-case
this is yRzRv and in the P-case this is yRuRv. This idea could be captured
by a somewhat different frame condition which demands the existence of an
intermediate world w between y and v. This condition is represented in figure
4. So the frame condition is xRyRzSxuRv ⇒ ∃w yRwRv and a corresponding
principle is ⊢ A ✄ B → (✸A ∧ ✷✷C) ✄ (B ∧ ✷C). In this way we discover a
new principle, say M1, which is clearly stronger than M0. It is an open question
whether M1 is valid in all reasonable arithmetical theories!
Another example of a principle in the intersection of ILM and ILP is the
principle A ✄✸B ⇒ ✷(A ✄ ✸B). In [29] it is shown that this principle is not
valid in all reasonable arithmetical theories.
5 Concluding Remarks
5.1 The Current Situation
At the moment of writing, we have a good picture of the relationships of the
salient logics produced by our quest for Il(all). There are the systems ILW and
ILM0 which are both modally complete and in the core logic we are looking
for. Then there is the logic ILW∗ which is the union of these two logics. It is
conjectured to be decidable and complete but the problem is still open. The
logic ILP0 is completely independent from ILM0, ILW and ILW
∗. It is also in
Il(all). The union of all these logics, ILP0W
∗, is conjectured to be Il(all).
 
 
 
 
 
 
?
IL ILM0 ILW
∗ Il(all)ILP0W
∗
ILP
ILM
ILP0
ILW
=
5.2 Two Questions
We end our paper by formulating two questions of more restricted scope than
our great problem.
Problem 1
The logic Il(all) is in the intersection of ILM and ILP. But it cannot be equal
to this system since e.g. the principle A ✄ ✸B → ✷(A ✄ ✸B) which is in the
intersection, is not generally valid. A proof of this fact is given in [29]. The
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proof employs a heavy result due to Shavrukov, see [18]. Is there a more direct
and more perspicuous proof of this fact?
Problem 2
Is the principle A ✄ B → (✸A ∧ ✷✷C) ✄ (B ∧ ✷C) arithmetically valid? It
is certainly in ILM and ILP and thus valid both in essentially reflexive and in
finitely axiomatized reasonable arithmetical theories. Moreover it can be shown
to be valid for I∆0+BΣ1+Ω1. Yet it is hard to see why it should be generally
valid. In fact we conjecture that it is not.
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